# Secure communications in quantum networks

Eleni Diamanti LIP6, CNRS, Sorbonne Université Paris Centre for Quantum Computing





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Horizon 2020 Programme







### The quantum revolutions



- Why doesn't the electron collapse onto the nucleus of an atom?
- Why are there thermodynamic anomalies in materials at low temperature?
- Why is light emitted at discrete colors?









Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976)

The first quantum revolution

Observation and macroscopic manifestation of quantum principles

# The quantum revolutions

	THE FIRST THAT	NITE ALL DAL DALLE PARTY	Insisting the disk disk   Insisting the disk disk			
Planck's quantum the	eory t	transisto	r hard disk	laser		
beginning of 20th centu	ury	1947	1954	1960	end 20 <sup>th</sup> / beginn	ing 21 <sup>st</sup>
				Contr First d	ol of single quantum quantum algorithms	particles
Richard Feynman	Serge Haroche		The sec	ond quantu	m revolution	
(1918–1988) And also Alain Aspect, Charles Bennett, Gilles Brassard, Artur Ekert, Peter Shor		ے in	Active manipulation of single quantum particles and interaction between multiple particles for applications			

## Quantum technologies

#### Unconditionally secure communication



#### A leap in computing power



# Increased understanding of complex physical systems



# Measurement precision beyond the classical limit



Information can be encoded on properties of **single quantum particles** which can be found in **superposition** states



Photons are ideal carriers of quantum information  $\rightarrow$  robust to ambient noise

 $\rightarrow$  can be transported over long distances



with  $\alpha,\,\beta$  complex numbers and

$$|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$$

Following the probabilities according to quantum mechanics, there is a non-zero probability of photon coming out!

#### Information can also be encoded on properties of entangled particles which exhibit nonlocal correlations

In classical physics, randomness comes from ignorance

Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox: same for quantum theory?



**Bell test:** there is no **local hidden variable** model that explains quantum correlations

In quantum physics, randomness does not come from ignorance!

#### No cloning theorem

Entanglement

Unknown quantum states cannot be cloned



A quantum communication network is a set of quantum systems linked together to

- exchange data
- use the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics (superposition, entanglement, measurement) in order to reinforce "classical" computer network services or to create new ones → quantum advantage in security, efficiency, computation...



The quantum systems - the nodes of the network - can be quantum processors, quantum sensors, quantum memories, or "simple" devices used to generate or measure quantum states, and are connected via optical fiber or free-space channels

# Applications of quantum communication networks



S. Wehner et al., Science 2018

## Securing network links: quantum key distribution

Modern cryptography relies on assumptions on the computational power of an eavesdropper  $\rightarrow$  symmetric, asymmetric, post-quantum cryptography

Quantum key distribution allows for exchange of sensitive data between two trusted parties with information-theoretic, long-term security guaranteed against an allpowerful eavesdropper

 $\rightarrow$  combined with suitable authentication and message encryption algorithms



Key information is encoded on photonic carriers

Analysis of errors due to Eve's perturbation leads to extraction of secret key

# **QKD** performance

Fiber Distance (km) 50 100 150 250 300 350 0 200 107 Performance of Mature protocols RT Decoy-state [64,65] point-to-point 10<sup>6</sup> APD COW [45] fibre-optic QKD DPS [66] 10<sup>5</sup> Secure Key Rate (bit/s) CV [43,46] systems 10<sup>4</sup> Emerging protocols 公 MDI [108,112] 10<sup>3</sup> -30 °C **RR-DPS** [93]  $\odot$ APD  $\triangle$ HD [87] 10<sup>2</sup> 10<sup>1</sup> -120 °C ED, H.-K. Lo, B. Qi, 10° APD Z. Yuan, npj Quantum -272 °C 10-1 Info. 2016 SNSPD ☆ 10<sup>-2</sup> 20 30 40 60 0 10 50 70 Channel Loss (dB)

Several protocols for the same functionality, fundamental limits in rate and range

Security:  $\frac{1}{2} \| \rho_{S_A} S_{BE} - \tau_{SS} \otimes \rho_E \|_1 \leq \varepsilon$  for any  $\rho_{A^n B^n E}$ 

	Discrete variables	Continuous variables		
Key encoding	Photon polarization, phase, time arrival	Electromagnetic field quadratures		
Detection	Single-photon	Coherent (homodyne/heterodyne)		
Post processing	Key readily available	Complex error correction		
Security	General attacks, finite-size, side channels	General attacks, finite-size, side channels		
	DD04 Decementate Calegrant	CV-OKD (one or two-way, Gaussian or		

BB84, Decoy state, Coherent One Way, Differential Phase Shift, (Measurement) device independent protocols CV-QKD (one or two-way, Gaussian or discrete modulation, coherent or squeezed states, post selection), (Measurement) device independent protocols



V. Scarani *et al.*, Rev. Mod. Phys. 2009 ED and A. Leverrier, Entropy 2015 F. Xu *et al.*, Rev. Mod. Phys. 2020 S. Pirandola *et al.*, Adv. Opt. Phot. 2020

### **Coherent state CV-QKD**



Composable, finite size security proof A. Leverrier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 2015, 2017 Classical post-processing: parameter estimation, error correction, privacy amplification

### **Experimental system**



Transmitted LO Pulsed operation Homodyne detection Gaussian modulation



#### Long-distance operation with optimized error correction and stability

P. Jouguet et al., Nature Photon. 2013

No single-photon detection Only standard telecom components Challenge: lack of network integration Operation in coherent optical telecom systems to improve compatibility with conventional architectures and reduce deployment cost

> Local LO: no related side channels, no LO intensity limitation, no multiplexing, constraints in laser linewidth

Transmitted LO Pulsed operation Homodyne detection Gaussian modulation

CW pulse shaping techniques: optimal use of spectrum, avoid inter-symbol interference, use of pilots, optimal Digital Signal Processing used for signal recovery

Amplified balanced photodiodes or Integrated coherent receivers (ICR): shot noise limited, low noise, high bandwidth

### Proper security analysis is crucial!



Asymptotic security proof for QPSK Extended to constellations of any cardinality

S. Ghorai, P. Grangier, ED, A. Leverrier, Phys. Rev. X 2019 A. Denys, P. Brown, A. Leverrier, Quantum 2021



## Bandwidth-efficient CV-QKD

PCS 64 and 256-QAM, dual pol., Nyquist pulses, 50% QPSK pilots, 600 Mbaud, 10 kHz linewidth lasers





Secret key rate higher than 65 Mbit/s at 10 km

Adapted to high secret key rates at moderate distance

#### Next steps:

Further optimization (pilots, DSP, stability) for smaller excess noise, longer distance Implementation of data reconciliation Full security proof with finite-size effects

# **CV-QKD** on chip

Challenge: high cost Photonic integration for reduced cost and scalable solutions

### Silicon photonic chips (CEA-LETI)



127 um

## QKD networks

Challenge: inherent range limitation due to optical fiber loss QKD networks and Satellite communications

Practical testbed deployment is crucial for interoperability, maturity, network integration aspects and topology, use case benchmarking, standardization of interfaces



High-speed solutions based on RFSoC technology for prototype deployment in Paris testbed

### iXblue



Academics, telecom operators, equipment providers, end users

Data centres, electrical power grids, governmental communication, medical file transfer, critical infrastructure,...





# Feasibility of satellite-to-ground CV-QKD



# Compatible with space-certified telecom components



1 GHz,  $V_A = 1$ ,  $\beta = 0.95$ , a = 0.75 m, pointing error 1 µrad, divergence angle 10 µrad, 3 dB fibre coupling loss

#### Security analysis for a fluctuating channel

Fading introduces an additional noise source

To reduce its variance division of data according to transmission efficiency

D. Dequal et al., npj Quant. Info. 2021



### Trusted node networks

If the distance between Alice and Bob exceeds the range of the system:

Alice-R: key1, R-Bob: key2, R: key1 $\oplus$ key2  $\rightarrow$  Bob: key2 $\oplus$ (key1 $\oplus$ key2) = key1



Y.-A. Chen et al., Nature 2021

#### EuroQCI program

Terrestrial and space segments

Focus on cost, range, network integration, quantum/classical coexistence, security, standards and certification, applications for the quantum internet

### Reducing trust requirements : quantum repeaters

#### From trusted nodes to end-to-end security

Entanglement distribution alleviates the need for trust in the nodes but quantum channels are lossy and noisy Quantum repeaters and processing nodes, quantum memories



TU Delft, M. Pompili et al., Science 2021

ICFO, D. Lago-Rivera et al., Nature 2021

#### Challenges

Storage time and efficiency Entanglement generation rates Limited range



### Near-term quantum network applications

Entanglement-based QKD, quantum coin flipping, unforgeable quantum money, anonymous transmission, communication complexity,...

Physical architecture

Mux

input

25 km SMF28

25 km SMF28

Bob

Demux

HPF

111

 $\lambda/4 \ \lambda/2 \ \lambda/4$ 

 $\lambda/4 \lambda/2 \lambda/4$ 

Sourc

MO

MO

FPBS

**FPBS** 

Laser 780 nm

Flexible entanglement distribution network for secure communication with a broadband AlGaAs source

F. Appas et al., npj Quant. Info. 2021

a

SNSPD

SNSPD

10 µm

AlGaAs chip

M fiber

4 fiber



### Unforgeable quantum money





### Unforgeable quantum money



Rigorously satisfies security condition for unforgeability  $\rightarrow$  quantum advantage with trusted terminal

General security framework for weak coherent states and anticipating quantum memory → minimize losses and errors for both trusted and untrusted terminal

M. Bozzio et al., npj Quant. Info. 2018 & Phys. Rev. A 2019

### **Entanglement verification**

Proof-of-principle verification of multipartite entanglement in the presence of dishonest parties

W. McCutcheon *et al.*, Nature Commun. 2016



Requires high performance resources Very small loss tolerance



Application to anonymous message transmission and electronic voting Verification phase guarantees anonymity and privacy

A. Unnikrishnan *et al.*, Phys. Rev. Lett. 2019 F. Centrone *et al.*, arXiv 2107.14719 Quantum communication networks will be part of the future quantum-safe communication infrastructure

Such an infrastructure can address a range of use cases with high security requirements in multiple configurations

The quantum communication toolbox is rich and increasingly advanced

Quantum technologies need to integrate into standard network and cryptographic practices to materialize the global quantum network vision

# Thank you!





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