



Microarchitectural Vulnerabilities -Assessment and Mitigation



ICE Seminar

Sep 8, 2022

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About me!

Maria MUSHTAQ, Safe and Secure Hardware (SSH), Communications and Electronics (COMELEC)



Distinctions:

- Portrait of Woman -International face of university @ UBS, France
- Recipient of HiPEAC International Mobility –Yale University, USA
- Recipient of ACM Young Researcher Award –ETH Zurich, Switzerland
- Recipient of Ministry of Defense scholarship
- Recipient of CNRS-Excellent Postdoc grant
- Admissible candidate by the academic jury of CNRS, 2020-2021



















Outline


• Information Security Perspective

Detection Framework


Mitigation Framework

• Conclusions & Future Pespectives









■A shared concern by many application domains









Computing Stack & Privilege Levels

- Information leakage is possible even under safe software!
 - Software is often encrypted by mathematically strong encryption techniques [RSA, AES, ECC etc.]

- Underlying hardware is vulnerable
 - Micro-architectural features leak information on the state of program's execution













■Shared Memory Architecture —An Abstract View!







■Leakage through Shared Memory





Key-dependent memory accesses create timing (Side-Channel) Information!



■Leakage Through Computational Optimizations












■Intel's x86 –the biggest casualty of security vulnerabilities!








- Threat Model –Why CSCAs are interesting?
 - CSCAs are Non-invasive, Passive & High-resolution
 - CSCAs do not respect privileges
 - o They are Cross CPU, Cross Core, Cross VM
 - All CSCAs [and other attacks too] work the same way:
 - Manipulate cache to a known state
 - Wait for the victim to perform its activity
 - Examine what has changed




o Hard to detect as they are part of the hardware design!




Prime+Probe Attack








Victim's Execution



Attacker Probes the Cache State



■State-of-the-Art on Defenses







■State-of-the-Art on Defenses



What is Missing?

- Mitigations are Vulnerability Specific
- Mitigations are not System-wide
- Mitigations are Performance Heavy

Randomization

Noise Addition

Noise Addition



o The Way Forward:

- O Attack surface is not completely known yet -rather expanding!
- Security paradigm is shifting
- Secure-by-Design –attacks are not feasible in the first place




Secure at Run-time —attacks can happen, but their impact & value is contained



Research Perspective

■The Big Picture




Mukhtar et al., Smart Flush: A Timing Countermeasure against FLUSH+RELOAD Cache-based Side-Channel Attack on RSA. Published at Elsevier Journal of Systems Architecture 2020.

Mushtaq et al., Improving Confidentiality Against Cache-based SCAs. Published at Conference of ACM WomENcourage-2017, Barcelona, Spain.



o Cache SCAs affect or alter cache behavior!








Performance Counters as features


#	Scope	Hardware Events
1		Data Cache Misses (L1-DCM)
2	Cache Level 1	Instruction Cache misses (L1-ICM)
3		Total cache misses (L1-TCM)
4	Cache Level 2	Instruction cache accesses (L2-ICA)
5		Instruction Cache misses (L2-ICM)
6		Total Cache accesses (L2-TCA)
7		Total cache misses (L2-TCM)
8	Cache Level 3	Instruction cache accesses (L3-ICA)
9		Total Cache accesses (L3-TCA)
10		Total cache misses (L3-TCM)
11		Branch Miss Prediction (BR_MSP)
12	System-wide	Total CPU Cycles (TOT_CYC)
13		Total Page Faults (Page-Faults)
14		Total Number of Instructions (TOT_INS)
15		Total Branch Instructions (BR_INS)




Performance Counters –Prime+Probe Attack
















o Performance Counters




Jnder Load Conditions
&
Multiple Attacks




Mushtaq et al., Machine Learning for Security: The case of Side-Channel Attack Detection at Run-time. Published at IEEE-ICECS, Bordeaux, France, 2018.



Performance Counters



Machine Learning Can Help!



Jnder Load Conditions
&
Multiple Attacks



Mushtaq et al., Machine Learning for Security: The case of Side-Channel Attack Detection at Run-time. Published at IEEE-ICECS, Bordeaux, France, 2018.




Machine Learning Models

#	Machine Learning Model	Type of Model
1	Linear Regression (LR)	Linear
2	Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)	Linear
3	Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM)	Linear
4	Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA)	Linear
5	Nearest Centroid	Linear
6	Naïve Bayes	Linear
7	K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)	Non-Linear
8	Perceptron	Non-Linear
9	Decision Tree	Non-Linear
10	Dummy	Non-Linear
11	Random Forest (RF)	Non-Linear
12	Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)	Non-Linear

https://scikit-learn.org/0.17/modules/classes.html



o Cache SCA Detection








Mushtaq et al., "WHISPER: A Tool for Run-time Detection of Cache Side-Channel Attacks" Published at IEEE-Access, 2022.

■ Proposed Framework — The Big Picture



Use-case Attacks

No.	Use-cases	Cryptosystem	OpenSSL Version	Key Recovery
1	Flush+Reload	RSA	0.9.71	Full Key
2	Flush+Reload	AES		Half Key
3	Flush+Reload	Flush+Reload AES	Full Key	
4	Flush+Flush AES 0.9.7l/	0.9.7l/ 1.0.1f	Half Key	
5	Flush+Flush	AES	1.0.11	Full Key
6	Prime+Probe	AES		Half Key
7	Prime+Probe	AES		Full Key
8	Spectre	Not crypto-specific	Linux Kernel 4.13.037	Full message exploitation
9	Meltdown	Not crypto-specific	Linux Kernel 4.13.037	Full message exploitation

Open source repository of our work: https://github.com/ECLab-ITU/Cache-Side-Channel-Attacks



F+R Attack on RSA Cryptosystem

Model	Loads	Accuracy	Speed	FP	FN	Overhead
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
	ZL	99.5	0.9	.498	.002	
LDA	ML	99.5	0.9	0.49	.01	0.9
	HL	99.4	0.9	.527	.073	
	ZL	99.5	0.9	0.5	0	
LR	ML	99.5	0.9	.494	.006	1.6
	HL	99.5	0.9	.462	.038	
	ZL	98.8	0.9	0.4	.78	
SVM	ML	90	0.9	0.17	9.83	1.3
	HL	95.8	0.9	3.21	.99	
	ZL	99.5	0.9	0.5	0	
QDA	ML	99.5	0.9	.494	.006	0.6
	HL	99.4	0.9	0.57	.03	







Computational Attacks





Computational Attacks






- Two CPU vulnerabilities discovered in 2018!
- Both exploit performance enhancement techniques





o Meltdown

Vulnerability: Permission check for address is done in parallel & out-of-order to the load instruction!









Meltdown Detection

Selected HPCs & SPCs



Scope of event	Hardware event	Feature ID
L3 cache	Total cache misses	L3_TCM
L3 cache	Total cache accesses	L3_TCA
System wide	Total page faults	page_faults
System wide	Total number of instructions	TOT_INS









o Meltdown Detection


Model	Load	Accuracy (%)	Speed (µs)	FP (%)	FN(%)	Overhead (%)
	NL	99.99	10	0.01	0	1.91
LDA	AL	99.91	10	0.09	0	
	FL	98.30	10	1.25	0.45	
	NL	99.41	10	0.59	0	2.21
LR	AL	97.45	10	1.95	0.60	
	FL	96.00	10	3.40	1.60	
	NL	99.99	10	0.01	0	2.00
SVM	AL	99.40	10	0.60	0	
	FL	98.35	10	1.39	0.26	







■ Proposed Framework — The Big Picture




o Simultaneous Attacks, Detection and Mitigation






Detection-based Protection under Linux







Detection-based Mitigation of F+R Attack on RSA







Outline

• Information Security Perspective

Detection Framework

Mitigation Framework

• Conclusions & Future Perspectives






Conclusions —at large

- O Side channel information leakage is powerful & attack surface is expanding
- Need-based protection has the potential to contain SCAs, both computational & storage, while retaining the performance benefits
- Detection is promising —can serve as the first line of defense in the absence of secureby-design solutions
- Machine learning can help improving security –use of specialized ML models and deep learning



Future Perspectives

Information Retrieval Attacks Software Software Software Internal Attack Surface on on Software Hardware Software External Hardware Hardware Hardware Internal on on Hardware Software Hardware External Trusted Computing Base (TCB) **Protected Software** [Hardware/Software]





Future Perspectives

 Security has become a 1st class design constraint –computing must be seen beyond classics


 Modern security challenges emerge from the way we compute today -radical changes at both the hardware & software levels are required

 No computing platform is secure today and attack surface will expand further—tools are required to contain existing vulnerabilities and future systems must be predictable!



Research Activities







Forcioli et al., Virtual Platofrm to Analyze Security of a System on Chip at Microarchitectural level, Published SILM, European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshop, 2021

Hamza et al., Diminisher: A Linux Kernel based Countermeasure for TAA Vulnerability, European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2021

France et al., Vulnerability Assessment of the Rowhammer Attack Using Machine Learning and the gem5 Simulator, at ACM workshop on secure and trustworthy cyber-physical systems, 2021

France et al., Implementing Rowhammer Memory Corruption in the gem5 Simulator, at Workshop on Rapid System Prototyping (RSP), 2021

Khatib et al., Unsupervised Network Intrusion Detection System for AVTP in Automotive Ethernet Networks, at IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium, 2022





Awareness Seminar

IP Paris & Telecom's 1st International Winter School on Microarchitectural Security – 5-9th of December 2022



https://www.ip-paris.fr/en/international-winter-school-microarchitectural-security-2022
https://www.ip-paris.fr/en/news/winter-school-microarchitectural-security-complex-and-transdisciplinary-emerging-subject
https://imtech.imt.fr/en/2022/09/07/side-channel-attacks-how-to-exploit-vulnerabilities-of-processors/

Paris, France.



Thank You!

[Discussion]





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