Assessing the risks associated with information leaks (IP Paris)

17 October 2025

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Olivier Rioul and Julien Béguinot draw on the tools of mathematical communication theory established by Claude Shannon in 1948 to measure and evaluate security flaws in unintentional (or auxiliary) communication channels, as well as to develop new standards in this field.

Olivier Rioul is a professor at the Information Processing and Communication Laboratory (LTCI) at Télécom Paris. With Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul supervises Julien Béguinot, PhD student.

Your research focuses on the security of systems that incorporate cryptographic solutions. What does that involve?

O.R: We are interested in the vulnerabilities of these devices. For example, when a circuit runs a cryptographic algorithm, it emits electromagnetic waves linked to power consumption. These can be measured using probes and, through signal processing, can reveal sensitive information about the key that secures the algorithm. In other words, an auxiliary communication channel (side channel) is created, which is unintentional and vulnerable to attack. We study and evaluate information leaks and possible attacks on these channels.

J.B: In addition, the security of devices (bank cards, cell phones, connected objects, etc.) or software using cryptography is systematically evaluated by laboratories approved in France by the National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) before they are placed on the market. Our work aims to improve existing evaluation methods, which is of direct interest to these laboratories.